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Abstract
If we know the probabilities p1; . . . ; pn of dierent situations s1; . . . ; sn, then we can
choose a decision Ai for which the expected benefit Ci  p1  ci1      pn  cin takes the
largest possible value, where cij denotes the benefit of decision Ai in situation sj. In many
real life situations, however, we do not know the exact values of the probabilities pj; we
only know the intervals pj  pÿj ; pj  of possible values of these probabilities. In order to
make decisions under such interval probabilities, we would like to generalize the notion
of expected benefits to interval probabilities. In this paper, we show that natural re-
quirements lead to a unique (and easily computable) generalization. Thus, we have a
natural way of decision making under interval probabilities. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science
Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction to the problem
Decision making: case of exactly known consequences. One of the main
problems in decision making is the problem of choosing one of (finitely many)
alternatives A1; . . . ;Am. For example, we may choose one of the possible lo-
cations of a new airport, one of the possible designs for a new plant; a farmer
needs to choose a crop to grow, etc.
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In some situations, we know the exact consequences of each choice; in
particular, we know the numerical benefits (e.g., monetary, utilities, etc.)
C1; . . . ;Cm which characterize the consequences of each choice. In such situa-
tions, the choice of the best alternative is easy: we simply choose the alternative
Ai for which the value Ci is the largest
Ci ! max
i
:
Decision making: case of exactly known probabilities. Most frequently,
however, for each choice Ai, the exact value of the benefit related to this choice
is not known beforehand, because this value depends not only on our choice,
but also on some situation which is beyond our control. For example, the
farmer’s benefits depend not only on his choice of a crop, but also on the
weather. Usually, in such cases, we can enumerate all possible situations
s1; . . . ; sn, and for each choice Ai and for each situation sj, we know (or at least
we can estimate) the value cij of the benefit that this choice will bring in the
situation sj. In such cases, in order to choose the best alternative, it helps to
know how probable dierent situations are.
Traditional methods of decision making (see, e.g., [7,17,20,23]) are based
on the assumption that we know the probabilities p1; . . . ; pn of dierent situa-
tions sj. In this case, we can take the average (expected) benefit Ci 
p1  ci1      pn  cin as a measure of quality of each alternative Ai, and
select the alternative for which this expected benefit takes the largest possible
value:
Ci  p1  ci1      pn  cin ! max
i
:
Decision making: a more realistic case of intervally known probabilities. In
some situations, we do not know the exact values of the probabilities pi. In-
stead, we only have the intervals pi  pÿi ; pi  of possible values of probabilities
(see, e.g., [15,21,31] and references therein).
Example (Cassini mission). As a recent example of the necessity of decision
making under interval probabilities, we can cite the planning of a Cassini
mission to Saturn; the technical discussion of the corresponding decision issues
is presented, e.g., in [18]. Since this mission was sent to the far bounds of the
Solar System, where the Solar light is very dim, it could not rely solely on Solar
batteries (as usual planetary missions), so a plutonium energy source was
added. The preference of a reasonable large amount of such highly radioactive
substance as plutonium made a possible launch failure a potential serious
health risk.
To make a decision, NASA followed the standard decision making para-
digm and tried to estimate the probability of this failure. However, researchers
196 R.R. Yager, V. Kreinovich / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 22 (1999) 195–215
soon pointed out (see [18] for more detail) that due to the large uncertainties in
the database, we cannot get the exact probabilities, we can, at best, get an in-
terval of possible values of these probabilities. So, instead of using the original
numerical estimate ep1  10ÿ6 for the probability of the disaster, the planners
should have used the whole interval p1  0; 10ÿ3 of possible values of p1.
Although acknowledged, this idea was not formally implemented in the
planning of the actual mission, mainly due to the lack of the appropriate de-
cision making techniques. Many NASA researchers are willing to take these
intervals into consideration when planning future missions.
Averaging: a natural idea. Of course, the interval probabilities pi must be
consistent, i.e., there should be values pi 2 pi which form a probability distri-
bution (i.e., for which p1      pn  1). For each such distribution
p  p1; . . . ; pn, we can compute the expected benefit Cip  p1  ci1
     pn  cin; the problem is that in the case of interval uncertainty, there are
many (actually, infinitely many) possible probability distributions, and dierent
distributions lead, in general, to dierent values of the expected benefit. We
would like to somehow combine, ‘‘average’’ these values Cip and come up
with a single numerical estimate of the quality of a given alternative. How can
we do that?
In this paper, we show how this ‘‘average’’ can be naturally defined. Namely,
we describe reasonable requirements on this ‘‘average’’ and then show that
these conditions uniquely determine an expression for this ‘‘average’’. Luckily
for decision making applications, this expression is easy to compute and is,
thus, very practical.
2. Towards a formalization of the problem
The desired quality Ci of an alternative Ai should only depend on the
properties of this particular alternative, and it should not depend on what
other alternatives are there. So, when computing Ci, we must only take in to
consideration, for each situation sj, its interval probability pj and the benefits
cij which corresponds to this situation sj (and we will not need the values ckj for
j 6 i). In view of this comment, we can simplify our notations by dropping the
index i (which characterizes the alternative), and denote the benefit corre-
sponding to the situation sj by cj instead of cij.
In these simplified notations, we can re-formulate our problem as follows:
· we have a finite sequence of pairs hpj; cji; 16 j6 n, (with consistent proba-
bility intervals pj); and
· we need to transform this sequence into a single number C.
In other words, we must design a function C which takes, as input, an ar-
bitrary consistent finite sequence of pairs hpj; cji and which returns a desired
estimate
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Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni:
There are some natural properties that we expect from this function.
1. First, we want to make sure that when we know the probabilities exactly,
i.e., when all the intervals are degenerate pi  pi; pi, we get the expected value:
Chp1; p1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; pn; cni  p1  c1      pn  cn: 1
2. A similar relation must be true when there is an uncertainty, but this
uncertainty is fictitious: namely, if we have only two situations, and we know
the exact probability p1 for one of them (i.e., p1  p1; p1), then, although we
may be given a non-degenerate interval p2 for the second probability, we know
that, due to the equality p1  p2  1, the only possible value of this second
probability is p2  1ÿ p1. In this case, the width of the interval p2 is irrelevant
and it is therefore reasonable to require that the resulting benefit will be the
same whether we use a wide interval p2, or the degenerate interval
1ÿ p1; 1ÿ p1:
Chp1; p1; c1i; hp2; c2i  Chp1; p1; c1i; h1ÿ p1; 1ÿ p1; c2i: 2
3. The third desired property comes from the fact that the order of the
situations is usually pretty much arbitrary: what was a situation #1 could as
well be situation #5, and vice versa. Therefore, the value of the desired function
should not change if we simply swap ith and jth situations:
Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpiÿ1; ciÿ1i; hpi; cii; hpi1; ci1i; . . . ; hpjÿ1; cjÿ1i; hpj; cji;
hpj1; cj1i; . . . ; hpn; cni
 Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpiÿ1; ciÿ1i; hpj; cji; hpi1; ci1i; . . . ;
hpjÿ1; cjÿ1i; hpi; cii; hpj1; cj1i; . . . ; hpn; cni: 3
4. The fourth desired property comes from the following: whatever are the
(unknown) actual probabilities pj 2 pj, the benefit cannot be worse than the
worst of the possibilities and cannot be better than the best of the possibilities.
In other words, the desired value C must always be between min cj and max cj:
min
j
cj6Chp1; p1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; pn; cni6max
j
cj: 4
5. The fifth property is related to the fact that while we have so far con-
sidered a single decision process (choosing Ai), we may have two or more in-
dependent decisions one after another:
· first choosing an alternative Ai from the first list of alternatives A1; . . . ;Am,
and then
· choosing an alternative A0k from the second list of alternatives A01; . . . ;A0q.
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The fact that these choices are independent means that for each pair of
choices Ai and A0k, the resulting benefit ecj in situation sj is simply equal to the
sum of the two benefits: the benefit cij of choosing Ai and the benefit c0kj of
choosing A0k. It is natural to require that in such a situation, the expected
benefit of the situation sj for the double choice is simply equal to the sum of
expected benefits corresponding to cj and c0j. In other words, we require that
Chp1; c1  c01i; . . . ; hpn; cn  c0ni  Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni
 Chp1; c01i; . . . ; hpn; c0ni: 5
6. The sixth property is related to the following fact: When we analyze the
possible consequences of our decisions, we try to list all possible situations by
imagining all possible combinations of events. Some of these events may be
relevant to our decision, some may later turn out to be irrelevant. As a result,
we may end up with two dierent situations, say s1 and s2, which result in the
exact same benefit value c1  c2. To simplify computations, it is desirable to
combine these two situations into a single one.
If we know the exact probabilities p1 and p2 of each of the original situa-
tions, then the probability of the combined situation is equal to p1  p2. If we
do not know the exact probability of each situation, i.e., if we only know the
intervals of possible values p1  pÿ1 ; p1  and p2  pÿ2 ; p2  of these probabilities,
then the probability of the combined event can take any value p1  p2 where
p1 2 p1 and p2  p2. This set of possible values is known to be also an interval,
with the bounds pÿ1  pÿ2 ; p1  p2 . In interval computations (see, e.g., [8,9,11–
13,19]), this new interval is called the sum of the two intervals p1 and p2 and
denoted by p1  p2.
The benefit of the decision should not change if we simply combine the two
actions with identical consequences into one. In other words, we must have:
Chp1; c1i; hp2; c1i; hp3; c3i; . . . ; hpn; cni
 Chp1  p2; c1i; hp3; c3i; . . . ; hpn; cni: 6
7. Finally, small changes in the probabilities pÿj or p

j or small changes in
benefits cj should not drastically aect the resulting benefit function C. In other
words, we want the function C to be continuous for any given n.
3. Definitions and the main result
Definition 1.
· By an interval probability p, we mean an interval p  pÿ; p  0; 1.
· We say that a finite sequence of interval probabilities p1; . . . ; pn is consistent
(or, to be more accurate, forms an interval probability distribution), if there
exist values p1 2 p1; . . . ; pn 2 pn for which p1      pn  1.
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Proposition 1. A sequence of interval probabilities p1  pÿ1 ; p1 ; . . . ; pn
 pÿn ; pn  is consistent if and only if pÿ1      pÿn 6 16 p1      pn :
Proof. By definition, a sequence of probability intervals is consistent if and only
if 1 can be represented as p1      pn for some pj 2 pj. According to the above
definition of the sum of intervals, this condition is, in its turn, equivalent to
1 2 p1      pn. From the above result about the sum of the intervals, we
know the exact expression for the endpoints of the interval p1      pn, so the
fact that 1 belongs to this intervals can expressed by the inequalities given in
the formulation of the proposition. The proposition is proven.
Definition 2. By an averaging operation for interval probabilities, we mean a
function C that transforms every finite sequence of pairs
hp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni
with consistent interval probabilities into a real number
Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni;
which is continuous for any n, and which satisfies conditions (1)–(6).
Theorem 1. There exists exactly one averaging operation with interval proba-
bilities, and this averaging operation has the form
Chpÿ1 ; p1 ; c1i; . . . ; hpÿn ; pn ; cni  ep1  c1      epn  cn; 7
where
epj  R ÿ 1R ÿ Rÿ  pÿj  1ÿ RÿR ÿ Rÿ  pj ; 8
Rÿ  pÿ1      pÿn ; 9
and
R  p1      pn : 10
Comments:
· So, if we have several alternatives Ai, and we know:
 the benefits cij of each alternative under each situation sj, and
 the interval probability pj  pÿj ; pj  of each situation,
we recommend to select a decision Ai for which
Ci  ep1  ci1      epn  cin ! max
i
;
where epj are determined by formulas (7) and (8).
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· Formula (8) can be re-written in the following equivalent form:
epj  pÿj  DpjDp  1ÿ pÿ1 ÿ    ÿ pÿn ; 8a
where Dpj  pj ÿ pÿj , and Dp  Dp1      Dpn. Since Rÿ  pÿ1     
pÿn 6 1, what we are doing is essentially adding to the lower probability pÿj an
amount proportional to the width Dpj  pj ÿ pÿj of the corresponding
probability interval pÿj ; pj . This width is a natural measure of uncertainty
with which we know the probabilities.
· Alternatively, we can represent formula (8) in another equivalent form:
epj  pj ÿ DpjDp  p1 ÿ     pn ÿ 1; 8b
Since R  p1      pn P 1, what we are doing is essentially subtracting
to the upper probability pj an amount proportional to the width
Dpj  pj ÿ pÿj of the corresponding probability interval pÿj ; pj .
· The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix A.
Example
· If all the interval probabilities coincide, we get epj  1=n for all j, so we must
choose an alternative Ai for which
Ci  ci1      cinn ! maxi :
· If we only know the upper bounds pi for the probabilities, i.e., if pÿi  0 for
all i, then
epj  pjp1      pn :
In this example, we must choose an alternative Ai for which
C  p

1  c1      pn  cn
p1      pn
! max :
· If we only know the lower bounds pÿi for the probabilities, i.e., if pi  1 for
all i, then
epj  nÿ 1nÿP pÿi  pÿj  1ÿ
P
pÿi
nÿP pÿi :
Comment: We have already mentioned that sometimes, the interval uncer-
tainty is fictitious: e.g., if we have only two situations, and we know the exact
probability p1 for one of them (i.e., p1  p1; p1), then, although we may be
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given a non-degenerate interval p2 for the second probability, we know that,
due to the equality p1  p2  1, the only possible value of this second proba-
bility is p2  1ÿ p1. In general, if we have n interval probabilities pÿi ; pi ,
16 i6 n, then, due to the condition p1      pn  1, we have pi 
1ÿ p1      piÿ1  pi1      pn; therefore, the actual value of pi must lie
between 1ÿ p1      piÿ1  pi1      pn  and 1ÿ pÿ1      pÿiÿ1
pÿi1      pÿn . As a result, for each i from 1 to n, only the values from the
‘‘reduced’’ interval p0i  p0iÿ; p0i are possible, where
p0ÿi  max pÿi ; 1
 
ÿ
X
j 6i
pi
!
and p0i  min pi ; 1
 
ÿ
X
j 6i
pÿi
!
: 11
For example, if we start with a sequence p1  0; 1, p2  0; 0:5, we get new
intervals p01  0:5; 1 and p02  0; 0:5. Here, the interval p01 is narrower than
the original interval p1  0; 1. In such situations, when one of these new in-
tervals is narrower than the original one, this means that a part of the original
uncertainty is ‘‘fictitious’’.
There are two possible approaches to such ‘‘fictitious’’ uncertainty:
· In the above text, we assumed that we can have an arbitrary sequence of in-
terval probabilities which is consistent in the sense of Definition 1. In partic-
ular, we may have a sequence p1  p1; p1, p2  1ÿ p1; 1, which includes
‘‘fictitious’’ probabilities. For this case, Theorem 1 justifies the use of formu-
las (7)–(10).
· Alternatively, we can first reduce the original sequence of probability distri-
butions to a new sequence (11), and then apply formulas (7)–(10) to the re-
sulting sequence p01; . . . ; p
0
n. The justification of this second approach is
provided by the following: if, in Definition 2, we restrict ourselves only to
reduced sequences of interval probabilities, then our proof of Theorem 1
shows, in eect, that thus restricted mapping is described by the same formu-
las (7)–(10).
4. Relation with other approaches to decision making
4.1. Averaging and Hurwicz criterion
Yet another reformulation of our result. The above formula (8) can be re-
formulates as follows:
epj  a  pÿj  1ÿ a  pj ; 8c
where a  R ÿ 1=R ÿ Rÿ. One can easily check that thus defined a be-
longs to the interval 0; 1. Thus, this formula is similar to another approach to
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decision making, originally proposed by Hurwicz. To explain how exactly these
two approaches are similar, let us first briefly describe Hurwicz’s approach.
Hurwicz criterion. This approach has been proposed for the situations in
which we have no information about the probabilities pj (i.e., in our terms,
when pj  0; 1 for all j).
In other words
· for decision making, we want, for each alternative Ai, to find a numerical
value Ci that would characterize the utility of this alternative;
· we do not know the exact value of the utility of each alternative Ai; instead,
we know a set of possible values of utility fci1; . . . ; cing that characterize the
outcome of this action Ai in dierent situations;
· we do not know which of the situations is more probable and which is less
probable, and therefore, we do not know which elements of this set are more
probable, and which are less probable.
For this situation, Hurwicz has proposed [10,17] to choose a real number
a 2 0; 1, and then characterize each alternative Ai by the value
Ci  a minfci1; . . . ; cing  1ÿ a maxfci1; . . . ; cing:
The meaning of this formula depends on a:
· When a  0, we judge each alternative based on the its most optimistic
outcome: Ci  maxfci1; . . . ; cing.
· When a  1, we judge each alternative based on its most pessimistic
outcome: Ci  minfci1; . . . ; cing.
· When 0 < a < 1, we use a realistic mix of pessimistic and optimistic esti-
mates to judge its alternative Ai.
Analogy with our situation. We have a similar situation:
· for decision making, we want, for each situation sj, to find a numerical valueepj that would characterize the probability of this situation;
· we do not know the exact value of the probability of each situation sj; in-
stead, we know a set of possible values of probability pÿj ; pj ;
· we do not know which elements of this set are more probable, and which are
less probable.
Following Hurwicz’s idea, we can fix a real number a 2 0; 1 and characterize
each situation sj by the numerical valueepj  a minfpj jpj 2 pÿj ; pj g  1ÿ a maxfpj jpj 2 pÿj ; pj g:
The corresponding minimum and maximum are, of course, equal to pÿj and p

j
and therefore, we get exactly formula (8c). The value a can be uniquely de-
termined from the condition that the values epj form a probability distribution,
i.e., that ep1      epn  1. So, the averaging operation can be viewed as an
analogue of Hurwicz criterion.
Comment: For dierent a, formula (8c) has been successfully used in decision
making; see, e.g., [2–4,16,24–26,28,29].
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4.2. Averaging and maximum entropy approach
Maximum entropy approach. Averaging over all possible distributions is not
the only possible approach. Alternatively, instead of considering all possible
probability distributions which are consistent with the given interval al prob-
abilities, we can select one probability distribution which is, in some reasonable
sense, the most representative, and make decisions based on this ‘‘most rep-
resentative’’ distribution.
One natural way of selecting the ‘‘most representative’’ distribution is the
maximum entropy approach (see, e.g., [6,14], and references therein; see also
[5,22,27,29]), according to which we select a probability distribution pj for
which the entropy S  ÿP pj  logpj take the largest possible value. This
distribution is relatively easy to describe [14]: there exists a value p0 such that
for all j:
· when pj 6 p0, we take pj  pj ;
· when p06 pÿj , we take pj  pÿj ;
· when pÿj 6 p06 pj , we take pj  p0.
This value p0 can be computed by a quadratic-time (i.e., quite feasible) algo-
rithm [14]. In particular, if all the interval probabilities coincide, then
p1      pn  p0  1=n.
In general, these two approaches lead to different results. In the above ex-
ample, our ‘‘averaging’’ approach leads to the same value as the maximum
entropy approach. However, in general, the resulting benefit
p1  c1      pn  cn is, different from the one produced by averaging. As an
example of this dierence, let us consider the case when we have two possible
situations: a situation s1 with a small interval probability p1  0; psmall
(psmall  1), and a situation s2 with the interval probability p2  1ÿ psmall; 1.
In this case:
· For averaging, we have Rÿ  1ÿ psmall, R  1 psmall, so averaging leads toep1  psmall=2 and ep2  1ÿ psmall=2. This is exactly what we can intuitively ex-
pected from averaging:
 an average of the interval 0; psmall is its midpoint psmall=2, and
 an average of the interval 1ÿ psmall; 1 is its midpoint 1ÿ psmall=2.
· For maximum entropy approach, we get ep1  psmall and ep2  1ÿ psmall.
Comment: Informally, the dierence between the two approaches can be
explained as follows. When all the interval probabilities coincide, both ap-
proaches return the same values of equal probabilities epj  1=n. In other
words, informally, both approaches try to get the probabilities as close to be
equal as possible. In this, both approaches agree; the dierence is in how
these two approaches interpret the word ‘‘close’’: the maximum entropy ap-
proach uses a non-linear expression (entropy) to describe this ‘‘closeness’’,
while in the averaging approach, we only consider expressions which are
linear in pj.
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Which approach is better? Which of the two approaches is better: maximum
entropy or averaging? On a general methodological level:
· there are arguments in favor of the maximum entropy approach (see, e.g.,
[6,14]),
· but there are also arguments in favor of our averaging: e.g., unlike the max-
imum entropy approach, our ‘‘averaging’’ solution takes into consideration
not just a single distribution, but all probability distributions consistent with
the given interval probabilities.
From the practical viewpoint, which of these approaches is better depends on
the objective that we want to achieve in a practical problem. For example, if
the first situation s1 leads to negative consequences, then the maximum entropy
approach means that we consider the worst-case (pessimistic) scenario by as-
suming the worst possible probability of this negative situation, while the av-
eraging approach takes a reasonable mid-point of the interval. So:
· if our objective is to avoid the worst-case scenario at any cost, we should use
maximum entropy method;
· on the other hand, if s1 is a reasonable risk, then averaging seems to be more
reasonable.
4.3. What if, in addition to interval probabilities pi, we also know the probabilities
of dierent values within the intervals pi?
Description of the problem and the resulting formula. In the above text, we
assumed that the only information that we have about the (unknown) prob-
abilities pj is that each of these probabilities belong to the corresponding in-
terval pj  pÿj ; pj . In some cases, however, the estimates pÿj and pj themselves
come from a statistical analysis of the existing records. In this case, in addition
to intervals pi, we may also know the probabilities of dierent values within the
intervals pi.
For example, we can simply look at all recorded situations, and count how
many of them were situations sj. If out of N total records, the situation sj
occurred in Nj of them, then we can take the frequency fj  Nj=N as a natural
estimate for the probability pj (for details on statistical methods, see any sta-
tistical textbook, e.g., [30]).
When the total number of records (N) is large, the error of this estimation,
i.e., the dierence fj ÿ pj between the frequency and the actual probability, is
negligible small. However, in many real-life cases, N is not too large, so this
dierence is not negligible. It is known in statistics that the probability dis-
tribution for this dierence fj ÿ pj is approximately Gaussian (and the larger N,
the closer this distribution to Gaussian), with 0 average and known standard
deviation rj. So, the desired probability pj  fj ÿ fj ÿ pj is distributed ac-
cording to the Gaussian distribution with the average fj and standard deviation
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rj. Dierent estimation errors fj ÿ pj are independent random variables, so the
random variables pj, pk, j 6 k are independent too.
How is this information related to intervals? In practically applications of
statistics, if we assume a Gaussian probability distribution with average m and
standard deviation r, and we observe a value x which is farther than k  r from
m (for some fixed k), we conclude that the distribution was wrong.
For example, if we test a sensor with the supposed standard deviation
r  0:1, and as a result of the testing, we get an error xÿ m  1:0, then
it’s is natural to conclude (for all k < 10) that the sensor is malfunction-
ing.
Of course, for every k, there is a non-zero probability that the random
variable x attains a value outside the interval mÿ k  r;m k  r, but for large
k, this probability is very small. In practical applications, people normally use
k  2 (for which the probability of error outside the interval is  5%), k  3
(for which the probability of error outside the interval is  0:1%), and, in VLSI
design and other important computer engineering applications, k  6 (for
which the probability of error outside the interval is  10ÿ6%). So, if we fix a
value k 2; 3; or 6, we conclude that the actual value of pj must fit within the
interval pj  pÿj ; pj , where
pÿj  fj  k  rj; pj  fj ÿ k  rj:
Vice versa, if we know this interval pÿj ; pj  and the value k, we can reconstruct
the parameters fj and rj of the corresponding Gaussian distribution as
mj 
pÿj  pj
2
; rj 
pj ÿ pÿj
2k
:
If we know the distributions for pj, then the problem of computing the
average values epj becomes a standard probability problem: namely, as epj, we
take the conditional expectation of pj under the condition that the sum of all
the probabilities is 1, i.e.,
epj  Epj jp1      pn  1:
We can now use the standard techniques of multi-dimensional Gaussian dis-
tributions to calculate this conditional expectation. Detailed derivation is given
in Appendix B; here we just present the result:
epj  fj  1ÿ R0  r2jP r2k ;
where R0  f1      fn. If we substitute, into this formula, the expressions for
fj and rj in terms of pÿj and p

j , we get the following expression:
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epj  pÿj  pj
2
 1ÿ R0  p

j ÿ pÿj 2Ppk ÿ pÿk 2 ;
where R0  Rÿ  R=2.
Relation to averaging. How dierent is this formula from the interval-based
average? If all the intervals pj are of the same width, then (as one can easily see)
we get the exact same averaging formula. However, if the intervals are of
dierent width, we get dierent formulas: e.g., for p1  0; 0:5 and p2  0; 1:
· for interval-based averaging, we get: Rÿ  0, R  1:5, so ep1  1=3 andep2  2=3, while
· the statistical averaging, we get: R0  0 1:5=2  0:75, so
ep1  0 0:5
2
 1ÿ 0:75  0:5ÿ 0
2
0:5ÿ 02  1ÿ 02  0:25
0:25  0:25
1:25
 0:25 0:05  0:3 6 1
3
;
and similarly ep2  0:7 6 2=3.
5. Conclusion
Making decisions when there exists some uncertainty with respect to the
payo to be received as a result of one’s choice of action is clearly the normal
state of aairs. In many of these situations, the expected value is used as a
means for comparing dierent courses of action. In order to calculate the ex-
pected value in a way to allow comparisons, precise information about the
probability of each of the dierent possible payos resulting from an alterna-
tive is needed. Unfortunately this type of precise probabilistic information is
often not available. In this work we have investigated the problem of calcu-
lating the expected value when the knowledge about the probabilities is of an
interval type. Diculty in attaining precise probabilities becomes particularly
manifest in environments in which human beings are the source of the infor-
mation about the probabilities. What is becoming quite apparent now is the
human inclination for granularization, a fact closely related to the use of lan-
guage. As a result of this quality, humans feel more comfortable providing
interval probability estimates then precise exact values. This inclination is often
due to the fact that perceptions rather then measurements are the basis of the
knowledge supplied. It is our feeling that the technique developed here will play
a central role in the construction of intelligent decision making systems, par-
ticularly those based upon the idea of computing with words.
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Appendix A. Proof of the Theorem
1. Let us first fix interval probabilities p1; . . . ; pn, and consider C as a
function of n variables c1; . . . ; cn:
F c1; . . . ; cn  Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni:
Property (5) says that this function F c1; . . . ; cn is additive. It is known (see,
e.g., [1, Section 4.1]) that every continuous additive function has the form
F c1; . . . ; cn  ep1  c1      epn  cn:
Thus, for every sequence of n interval probabilities, there exists n real valuesep1; . . . ;epn which depend on these interval probabilities and for which
Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni  ep1  c1      epn  cn: A:1
Therefore, to describe the function C, it is sucient to describe the transfor-
mation T that maps a sequence of finitely many intervals pj into a sequence of
exactly as many values epj:
p1; . . . ; pn ! ep1; . . . ;epn:
2. If we take c1      cn  1, then from property (4), we conclude that
1  min
j
cj6Chp1; c1i; . . . ; hpn; cni  ep1  c1      epn  cn
 ep1      epn6maxj cj  1;
and thus,ep1      epn  1:
3. So far, we have used properties (4) and (5). Using Eq. (A.1), we can re-
formulate all other properties in terms of the transformation T.
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Property (1) says that if all intervals are degenerate, then T keeps them
intact:
p1; p1; . . . ; pn; pn ! p1; . . . ; pn: 10 
Similarly, (2) turns into:
p1; p1; p2 ! p1; 1ÿ p1: 20 
Property (3) turns into the following rule: If
p1; . . . ; piÿ1; pi; pi1; . . . ; pjÿ1; pj; pj1; . . . ; pn
! ep1; . . . ;epiÿ1;epi;epi1; . . . ;epjÿ1;epj;epj1; . . . ;epn;
then
p1; . . . ; piÿ1; pj; pi1; . . . ; pjÿ1; pi; pj1; . . . ; pn
! ep1; . . . ;epiÿ1;epj;epi1; . . . ;epjÿ1;epi;epj1; . . . ;epn: 30 
Property (6) means that if
p1; p2; . . . ; pn ! ep1;ep2; . . . ;epn;
then
p1  p2; . . . ; pn ! ep1  ep2; . . . ;epn: 60 
Finally, condition (7) means that the transformation T is continuous.
4. Let us first make a comment that will be used in the following proof. Due
to symmetry (30), if two of n intervals coincide, i.e., if pi  pj, then the resulting
values epi and epj must be equal too.
5. We want to prove that the transformation T is described by formula (8)
for all intervals pj. To prove it, let us first start by showing that this is true for
intervals pj  pÿj ; pj  with rational endpoints.
Since all the endpoints are rational, we can reduce them to a common de-
nominator. Let us denote this common denominator by N; then each of the
endpoints pÿj and p

j has the form m=N for a non-negative integer m. Let us
denote the corresponding numerators by mÿj and m

j ; then, we have p
ÿ
j  mÿj =N
and pj  mj =N (where mÿj  N  pÿj and mj  N  pj ).
Each interval pj  mÿj =N ;mj =N  can be represented as a sum of mÿj de-
generate intervals 1=N ; 1=N  and mj ÿ mÿj non-degenerate intervals 0; 1=N .
Totally, we get mÿ1      mÿn  N  pÿ1      pÿn   N  Rÿ degenerate in-
tervals 1=N ; 1=N  and N  R ÿ Rÿ non-degenerate intervals 0; 1=N . So, if
we know how the transformation T transforms the resulting ‘‘long list’’ of
N  Rÿ  N  R ÿ Rÿ  N  R intervals, we will be able to use property (60)
and find the result of applying T to the original set of intervals.
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What is the result of applying T to this long list? This long list contains
intervals of two types, and intervals of each type are identical. We have already
proven in part 4 of this proof that if two intervals from the list are equal, then
the corresponding values of epj are equal too. Thus:
· the transformation T maps all degenerate intervals 1=N ; 1=N  into one and
the same value; we will denote this value by a;
· similarly, the transformation T maps all non-degenerate intervals 0; 1=N 
into one and the same value; we will denote this value by b.
So, we get the mapping
1
N
;
1
N
 
; . . . ;
1
N
;
1
N
 
; 0;
1
N
 
; . . . ; 0;
1
N
  
! a; . . . ; a; b; . . . ; b: A:2
If we apply property (60 to this formula, then we can conclude that
. . . ; pj; . . .  . . . ;
1
N
;
1
N
 
     1
N
;
1
N
 
mÿj times  0;
1
N
 
   
 0; 1
N
 
mj ÿ mÿj times; . . .

! . . . ; a     a mÿj times  b   
 b mj ÿ mÿj times; . . .
 . . . ;cpj; . . .;
where
epj  mÿj  a mj ÿ mÿj   b: A:3
So, to find the values epj, it is sucient to determine the values of the parameters
a and b.
To determine these parameters, we will also use the additivity property (60).
Namely, from (A.2), we can similarly conclude that
1
N
;
1
N
 
     1
N
;
1
N
 
N  Rÿ times  0; 1
N
 
   
 0; 1
N
 
N  R ÿ Rÿ times

! a     a N  Rÿ times  b   
 b N  R ÿ Rÿ times
 N  Rÿ  a;N  R ÿ Rÿ  b: A:4
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The sums of the intervals in the left-hand side of (A.4) can be explicitly cal-
culated:
1
N
;
1
N
 
     1
N
;
1
N
 
N  Rÿ times  N  R
ÿ
N
;
N  Rÿ
N
 
 Rÿ;Rÿ;
and
0;
1
N
 
 . . . 0; 1
N
 
N  R ÿ Rÿ times  0;N  R
 ÿ Rÿ
N
 
 0;R ÿ Rÿ:
Thus, (A.4) takes the form
Rÿ;Rÿ; 0;R ÿ Rÿ ! N  Rÿ  a;N  R ÿ Rÿ  b: A:5
On the other hand, from (20), we conclude that
Rÿ;Rÿ; 0;R ÿ Rÿ ! Rÿ; 1ÿ Rÿ: A:6
Comparing (A.5) and (A.6), we conclude that
N  Rÿ  a  Rÿ A:7
and
N  R ÿ Rÿ  b  1ÿ Rÿ: A:8
From Eq. (A.7), we conclude that
a  1
N
: A:9
From Eq. (A.8), we conclude that
b  1
N
 1ÿ R
ÿ
R ÿ Rÿ : A:10
Substituting the expression for a and b into formula (A.3), we conclude that
epj  mÿjN  mj ÿ mÿjN  1ÿ RÿR ÿ Rÿ : A:11
By definition of the numbers mÿj , we conclude that m
ÿ
j =N  pÿj and that
mj ÿ mÿj =N  mj =N ÿ mÿj =N  pj ÿ pÿj . Therefore, (A.11) takes the form
epj  pÿj  pj ÿ pÿj   1ÿ RÿR ÿ Rÿ :
Grouping together terms proportional to pÿj , we conclude that
epj  pÿj  1 ÿ 1ÿ RÿR ÿ Rÿ

 pj 
1ÿ Rÿ
R ÿ Rÿ ; A:12
and finally, subtracting the two fractions in (A.12), we get the desired result.
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6. We have shown that formula (8) holds for all intervals with rational
endpoints. Since the transformation T is continuous (7), and since every in-
terval can be represented as a limit of intervals with rational endpoints, we can
conclude, by tending to a limit, that this formula is true for all intervals. The
theorem is proven.
Appendix B. Derivation of the statistical formula for epj
According to mathematical statistics (see, e.g., [30, Ch. 5]), if we have two
Gaussian random variables X and Y, then the conditional mathematical ex-
pectation EX jY  y is equal to a  y  b, where the coecients a and b are
determined from the condition that
E X
h
ÿ aY ÿ b2
i
! min
a;b
:
Dierentiating the optimized function with respect to a and b and equating the
resulting derivatives to 0, we conclude that
a  EY 2  b  EY   EX  Y ;
a  EY   b  E1  EX :
In our case, X  pj and Y  p1      pn. Hence, EX   fj, and
EY   f1      fn. In the following text, we will denote this sum by R0.
The value EX  Y  can be represented as
EX  Y   Epjp1      pjÿ1  pj  pj1      pn
 Ep2j  
X
k 6j
Epj  pk:
The first term in this sum is equal to f 2j  r2j . Since for k 6 j, pj and pk are
independent random variables, each other term is equal to Epj  Epk  fj  fk.
Thus,
EX  Y   f 2j  r2j 
X
k 6j
fj  fk:
Adding the term f 2j  fj  fj to the sum, we conclude that
EX  Y   r2j  fj 
X
k
fk
 !
 r2j  fj  R0:
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Similarly,
EY 2  E
X
k
pk
 !

X
k
pk
 !" #

X
k
Ep2k  
X
k
X
l 6k
Epk  pl

X
k
f 2k 
X
k
r2k 
X
k
X
l 6k
fk  fl:
Separating the terms that correspond to P fk2, we conclude that
Ey2 
X
k
fk
 !2

X
k
r2k  R20 
X
k
r2k :
Thus, the above equations for a and b take the form:
a  R20
"

X
k
r2k
#
 b  R0  fj  R0  r2j ;
a  R0  b  fj:
If we multiply the second equation by R0 and subtract the result from the
first equation, we get an equation which contains only one unknown a:
a P r2k  r2j . Therefore,
a  r
2
jP
r2k
:
Substituting this value a into the second equation, we can now calculate b as
b  fj ÿ a  R0  fj ÿ
r2jP
r2k
 R0:
Thus, the desired conditional expectation is equal to
a  y  b  r
2
jP
r2k
 1 fj ÿ
r2jP
r2k
 R0  fj 
1ÿ R0  r2jP
r2k
:
The formula is proven.
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